ACLU Strikes Deal To Continue Humane Conditions At Hutto Detention Center in Texas
The deal comes on the heels of an announcement Thursday that the government will immediately begin ending the detention of families at Hutto, the focus of 2007 lawsuits filed by the ACLU charging that children were being illegally imprisoned under inhumane conditions. The last family is expected to be released from Hutto no later than the end of the year.
The Obama Administration has finally agreed to close this prison where families with children, including babies, had been held in immigration detention, e.g., jail, for months and years. Small children were locked up in prison cells for up to 12 hours a day and only given 1 hour of school education until the ACLU filed suit against the previous Bush Administration polices.
Here is the link:" http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/40648prs20090807.html
A weekly discussion of issues and current trends in immigration law and specifically deportation cases. (510) 863-8058
Monday, August 10, 2009
Friday, July 31, 2009
Friday, July 17, 2009
DHS Reverse Policy on Asylum Applications for Victims of Domestic Violence
As the New York Times reported July 16, 2009, the Obama Administration, announced in a Supplemental Brief submitted to the Board of Immigration Appeals, a 180 degree reversal from the prior position taken by former Attorney General MuKasey on the question of whether the government recognizes claims for asylum from victims of domestic violence. All of these claims fall under the protection category of "Membership in a Particular Social Group."
The BIA in 1999 issued a precedent decision in Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999), vacated, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I&N Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded, 24 I&N Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008), which has not conclusively decided the issue of whether asylum claims can be based upon domestic violence.
However, for the first time, the attorneys for the Department of Homeland Security have articulated two scenarios that they acknowledge would fall within the criteria of a grant of asylum. In the brief submitted to the BIA, the DHS attorney states, "the Department will offer here alternative formulations of 'particular social group' that could, in appropriate cases, qualify aliens for asylum or withholding of removal." Pg. 5.
The government brief continues and holds, "that the particular social group in asylum and withholding claims based on domestic violence is best defined in light of the evidence about how the respondent's abuser and her society perceive her role within the domestic relationship." Pg. 14. DHS puts forward two possible formulations of the social group, "Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" or as "Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship." Id.
The change by the Obama Administration is dramatic and will potentially open the door to women who have suffered domestic violence at the hands of the abusive spouses. Many thanks to Karen Musalo from the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at UC Hastings School of Law in San Francisco, California.
The BIA in 1999 issued a precedent decision in Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999), vacated, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded, 23 I&N Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005), remanded, 24 I&N Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008), which has not conclusively decided the issue of whether asylum claims can be based upon domestic violence.
However, for the first time, the attorneys for the Department of Homeland Security have articulated two scenarios that they acknowledge would fall within the criteria of a grant of asylum. In the brief submitted to the BIA, the DHS attorney states, "the Department will offer here alternative formulations of 'particular social group' that could, in appropriate cases, qualify aliens for asylum or withholding of removal." Pg. 5.
The government brief continues and holds, "that the particular social group in asylum and withholding claims based on domestic violence is best defined in light of the evidence about how the respondent's abuser and her society perceive her role within the domestic relationship." Pg. 14. DHS puts forward two possible formulations of the social group, "Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave" or as "Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship." Id.
The change by the Obama Administration is dramatic and will potentially open the door to women who have suffered domestic violence at the hands of the abusive spouses. Many thanks to Karen Musalo from the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at UC Hastings School of Law in San Francisco, California.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
VAWA Appeal to Vermont Service Center
Just received notice from the Vermont Service Center that our office's recently submitted I-290 AAO Appeal of a denied VAWA self-petition will be reopened.
No reason given in the notice, but I suspect that it was the argument made that it is not permitted under the statute to use the testimony of the abuser as forming the basis of denying the VAWA claim. This is an impermissible use and constitutes a Breach of Confidentiality under IIRIRA § 384
Furthermore, any breach of these confidentiality laws can be prosecuted under the same statute. “Anyone who willfully uses, publishes, or permits information to be disclosed in violation of this section . . . shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action and subject to a civil money penalty of not more that $5,000 for each violation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c); IIRAIRA § 384(c).
No reason given in the notice, but I suspect that it was the argument made that it is not permitted under the statute to use the testimony of the abuser as forming the basis of denying the VAWA claim. This is an impermissible use and constitutes a Breach of Confidentiality under IIRIRA § 384
Furthermore, any breach of these confidentiality laws can be prosecuted under the same statute. “Anyone who willfully uses, publishes, or permits information to be disclosed in violation of this section . . . shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action and subject to a civil money penalty of not more that $5,000 for each violation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c); IIRAIRA § 384(c).
Thursday, June 18, 2009
I-290 Appeal of Denied I-360 VAWA Petition
Just finished an interesting AAO appeal of a denied I-360 VAWA petition to the Vermont Service Center of USCIS.
The government denied our client's I-360 Self-Petition essentially based upon the testimony given by the abuser at the I-130 interview where he intentionally sabotaged the interview so that our client would not receive the immigration benefit and would in fact be ordered deported back to India, where the U.S. citizen abuser would have total control over our client
Our argument was based upon the fact that USCIS explicitly cited to and ultimately based their adverse determination upon the discrepant testimony provided by the USC abuser during the 2007 adjustment interview.
As such, this is a clear violation of the confidentiality provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1); IIRAIRA § 384(a)(1).
Furthermore, any breach of these confidentiality laws can be prosecuted under the same statute. “Anyone who willfully uses, publishes, or permits information to be disclosed in violation of this section . . . shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action and subject to a civil money penalty of not more that $5,000 for each violation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c); IIRAIRA § 384(c).
Congress enacted this law and the associated penalties, specifically so that abusers could not use the immigration system as a weapon against domestic violence victims. When immigration officials take action based on information provided by the batterer, as is the case here, they violate the law and contravene the purposes behind VAWA.
The statute holds that CIS cannot deny a VAWA self-petition based on information provided solely by the batterer. See IIRAIRA § 384(a)(1).
In adjudicating our client's I-360 self-petition, she cannot be deemed inadmissible or deported based upon information from her batterer and CIS cannot deny a VAWA self-petition based upon information provided by her USC abuser . See 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1).
The government denied our client's I-360 Self-Petition essentially based upon the testimony given by the abuser at the I-130 interview where he intentionally sabotaged the interview so that our client would not receive the immigration benefit and would in fact be ordered deported back to India, where the U.S. citizen abuser would have total control over our client
Our argument was based upon the fact that USCIS explicitly cited to and ultimately based their adverse determination upon the discrepant testimony provided by the USC abuser during the 2007 adjustment interview.
As such, this is a clear violation of the confidentiality provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1); IIRAIRA § 384(a)(1).
Furthermore, any breach of these confidentiality laws can be prosecuted under the same statute. “Anyone who willfully uses, publishes, or permits information to be disclosed in violation of this section . . . shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action and subject to a civil money penalty of not more that $5,000 for each violation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c); IIRAIRA § 384(c).
Congress enacted this law and the associated penalties, specifically so that abusers could not use the immigration system as a weapon against domestic violence victims. When immigration officials take action based on information provided by the batterer, as is the case here, they violate the law and contravene the purposes behind VAWA.
The statute holds that CIS cannot deny a VAWA self-petition based on information provided solely by the batterer. See IIRAIRA § 384(a)(1).
In adjudicating our client's I-360 self-petition, she cannot be deemed inadmissible or deported based upon information from her batterer and CIS cannot deny a VAWA self-petition based upon information provided by her USC abuser . See 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1).
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Recent Ninth Circuit Decision Reaffirms Lujan Exception to First Offense, Simple Possession Conviction
The long standing law within the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit is that a first-time, simple possession of a narcotic, does
not subject the alien to removal if the alien would have been
eligible for inclusion under the Federal First Offenders Act [FFOA].
In this instance, Petitioner’s arrest and deferred entry of judgment
for “Attempted Possession of a Narcotic” squarely falls within the
Lujan-Armendariz line of cases. This holding was recently reaffirmed
in a February 4, 2009, decision Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey cited
below.
“[T]he relevant question is whether the person involved could
have received relief under the [FFOA] and does receive relief under a
state rehabilitative statute." Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738
n.18; see also Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1136 ("If [the
petitioner] would have been eligible for first offender treatment
under federal law, he would not stand 'convicted' for purposes of the
immigration laws."); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he INS may not discriminate against aliens convicted of
simple possession offenses whose subsequent conduct would have
qualified them for FFOA rehabilitation, but for the fact that they
were convicted and rehabilitated under the laws of another
sovereign."). Similarly, when we have denied FFOA treatment to an
alien convicted under state law, it has consistently been because the
alien would not have been eligible for relief under the FFOA.”
Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2009).
Circuit is that a first-time, simple possession of a narcotic, does
not subject the alien to removal if the alien would have been
eligible for inclusion under the Federal First Offenders Act [FFOA].
In this instance, Petitioner’s arrest and deferred entry of judgment
for “Attempted Possession of a Narcotic” squarely falls within the
Lujan-Armendariz line of cases. This holding was recently reaffirmed
in a February 4, 2009, decision Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey cited
below.
“[T]he relevant question is whether the person involved could
have received relief under the [FFOA] and does receive relief under a
state rehabilitative statute." Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738
n.18; see also Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1136 ("If [the
petitioner] would have been eligible for first offender treatment
under federal law, he would not stand 'convicted' for purposes of the
immigration laws."); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he INS may not discriminate against aliens convicted of
simple possession offenses whose subsequent conduct would have
qualified them for FFOA rehabilitation, but for the fact that they
were convicted and rehabilitated under the laws of another
sovereign."). Similarly, when we have denied FFOA treatment to an
alien convicted under state law, it has consistently been because the
alien would not have been eligible for relief under the FFOA.”
Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2009).
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