Just finished an interesting AAO appeal of a denied I-360 VAWA petition to the Vermont Service Center of USCIS.
The government denied our client's I-360 Self-Petition essentially based upon the testimony given by the abuser at the I-130 interview where he intentionally sabotaged the interview so that our client would not receive the immigration benefit and would in fact be ordered deported back to India, where the U.S. citizen abuser would have total control over our client
Our argument was based upon the fact that USCIS explicitly cited to and ultimately based their adverse determination upon the discrepant testimony provided by the USC abuser during the 2007 adjustment interview.
As such, this is a clear violation of the confidentiality provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1); IIRAIRA § 384(a)(1).
Furthermore, any breach of these confidentiality laws can be prosecuted under the same statute. “Anyone who willfully uses, publishes, or permits information to be disclosed in violation of this section . . . shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action and subject to a civil money penalty of not more that $5,000 for each violation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1367(c); IIRAIRA § 384(c).
Congress enacted this law and the associated penalties, specifically so that abusers could not use the immigration system as a weapon against domestic violence victims. When immigration officials take action based on information provided by the batterer, as is the case here, they violate the law and contravene the purposes behind VAWA.
The statute holds that CIS cannot deny a VAWA self-petition based on information provided solely by the batterer. See IIRAIRA § 384(a)(1).
In adjudicating our client's I-360 self-petition, she cannot be deemed inadmissible or deported based upon information from her batterer and CIS cannot deny a VAWA self-petition based upon information provided by her USC abuser . See 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1).
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Recent Ninth Circuit Decision Reaffirms Lujan Exception to First Offense, Simple Possession Conviction
The long standing law within the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit is that a first-time, simple possession of a narcotic, does
not subject the alien to removal if the alien would have been
eligible for inclusion under the Federal First Offenders Act [FFOA].
In this instance, Petitioner’s arrest and deferred entry of judgment
for “Attempted Possession of a Narcotic” squarely falls within the
Lujan-Armendariz line of cases. This holding was recently reaffirmed
in a February 4, 2009, decision Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey cited
below.
“[T]he relevant question is whether the person involved could
have received relief under the [FFOA] and does receive relief under a
state rehabilitative statute." Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738
n.18; see also Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1136 ("If [the
petitioner] would have been eligible for first offender treatment
under federal law, he would not stand 'convicted' for purposes of the
immigration laws."); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he INS may not discriminate against aliens convicted of
simple possession offenses whose subsequent conduct would have
qualified them for FFOA rehabilitation, but for the fact that they
were convicted and rehabilitated under the laws of another
sovereign."). Similarly, when we have denied FFOA treatment to an
alien convicted under state law, it has consistently been because the
alien would not have been eligible for relief under the FFOA.”
Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2009).
Circuit is that a first-time, simple possession of a narcotic, does
not subject the alien to removal if the alien would have been
eligible for inclusion under the Federal First Offenders Act [FFOA].
In this instance, Petitioner’s arrest and deferred entry of judgment
for “Attempted Possession of a Narcotic” squarely falls within the
Lujan-Armendariz line of cases. This holding was recently reaffirmed
in a February 4, 2009, decision Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey cited
below.
“[T]he relevant question is whether the person involved could
have received relief under the [FFOA] and does receive relief under a
state rehabilitative statute." Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738
n.18; see also Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1136 ("If [the
petitioner] would have been eligible for first offender treatment
under federal law, he would not stand 'convicted' for purposes of the
immigration laws."); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he INS may not discriminate against aliens convicted of
simple possession offenses whose subsequent conduct would have
qualified them for FFOA rehabilitation, but for the fact that they
were convicted and rehabilitated under the laws of another
sovereign."). Similarly, when we have denied FFOA treatment to an
alien convicted under state law, it has consistently been because the
alien would not have been eligible for relief under the FFOA.”
Ramirez-Altamirano v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2009).
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa
Our office has an interesting new case involving two children who came to the U.S. after their father was killed by India Police after an attack on a bus in the Punjab Province. I have been looking at the possibility of somehow obtaining a Special Immigrant Juvenile Visa for them and ran across this USCIS Memo.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Policy and Strategy and Domestic
Operations
Washington, DC 20529-2140
HQOPS 70/8.5
Memorandum
TO: Field Leadership
FROM: Donald Neufeld /s/
Acting Associate Director
Domestic Operations
Pearl Chang /s/
Acting Chief
Office of Policy & Strategy
DATE: March 24, 2009
SUBJECT: Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions
1. Purpose
This memorandum will inform immigration service officers working Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) petitions about new legislation affecting adjudication of petitions filed for SIJ status.
2. Background
On December 23, 2008, the President signed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA 2008), Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). Section 235(d) of the TVPRA 2008 amends the eligibility requirements for SIJ status at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and accompanying adjustment of status eligibility requirements at section 245(h) of the INA. Most SIJ provisions of the TVPRA 2008 take effect March 23, 2009, although some provisions took effect on December 23, 2008, the date of enactment of the TVPRA 2008.
3. Field Guidance
Eligibility for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions
Page 2
The TVPRA 2008 amended the definition of a “Special Immigrant Juvenile” at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the INA in two ways. First, it expanded the group of aliens eligible for SIJ status. An eligible SIJ alien now includes an alien:
* who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court;
* whom a juvenile court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State; or
* who has been placed under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court.
Accordingly, petitions that include juvenile court orders legally committing a juvenile to or placing a juvenile under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by a juvenile court are now eligible. For example, a petition filed by an alien on whose behalf a juvenile court appointed a guardian now may be eligible. In addition, section 235(d)(5) of the TVPRA 2008
specifies that, if a state or an individual appointed by the state is acting in loco parentis, such a state or individual is not considered a legal guardian for purposes of SIJ eligibility.
The second modification made by the TVPRA 2008 to the definition of special immigrant juvenile concerns the findings a juvenile court must make in order for a juvenile court order to serve as the basis for a grant of SIJ status. Previously, the juvenile court needed to deem a juvenile eligible for long term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment. Under the TVPRA 2008 modifications, the juvenile court must find that the juvenile’s reunification with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law. In short, the TVPRA 2008 removed the need for a juvenile court to deem a juvenile eligible for long-term foster care and replaced it with a requirement that the juvenile court find reunification with one or both parents not viable. If a juvenile court order includes a finding that reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to a similar basis found under State law, the petitioner must establish that such a basis is similar to a finding of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Officers should ensure that juvenile court orders submitted as evidence with an SIJ petition filed on or after March 23, 2009, include this new language.
A petitioner is still required to demonstrate that he or she has been the subject of a determination in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.
Age Requirements
Section 235(d)(6) of the TVPRA 2008 provides age-out protection to SIJ petitioners. As of December 23, 2008, if an SIJ petitioner was a “child” on the date on which an SIJ petition was properly filed, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) cannot deny SIJ status to anyone, regardless of the petitioner’s age at the time of adjudication. Officers must now consider the petitioner’s age at the time of filing to determine whether the petitioner has met the age requirement. Officers must not deny or revoke SIJ status based on age if the alien was a child on the date the SIJ petition was properly filed if it was filed on or after December 23, 2008, or if it was pending as of December 23, 2008. USCIS interprets the use of the term “child” in section 235(d)(6) of the TVPRA 2008 to refer to the definition of child found at section 101(b)(1) of the INA, which states that a child is an unmarried person under 21 years of age. The SIJ definition
found at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the INA does not use the term “child,” but USCIS had previously incorporated the child definition at section 101(b)(1) of the INA into the regulation governing SIJ petitions.
Consent
The TVPRA 2008 also significantly modifies the two types of consent required for SIJ petitions.
Consent to the grant of SIJ status (previously express consent)
The TVPRA 2008 simplified the “express consent” requirement for an SIJ petition. The Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) must consent to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status. This consent is no longer termed “express consent” and is no longer consent to the dependency order serving as a precondition to a grant of SIJ status.
The consent determination by the Secretary, through the USCIS District Director, is an acknowledgement that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide. This means that the SIJ benefit was not “sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or
neglect or abandonment.” See H.R. Rep. No. 105-405, at 130 (1997). An approval of an SIJ petition itself shall be evidence of the Secretary’s consent.
Specific consent
The TVPRA 2008 completely altered the “specific consent” function for those juveniles in federal custody. The TVPRA 2008 vests this function with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) rather than the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as previously delegated to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In addition, Congress simplified the
language to refer simply to “custody,” not actual or constructive custody, as was previously delineated. However, the requirement remains that an SIJ petitioner need only seek specific consent if the SIJ petitioner seeks a juvenile court order determining or altering the SIJ petitioner’s custody status or placement. If an SIJ petitioner seeks to obtain or obtains a juvenile
court order that makes no findings as to the SIJ petitioner’s custody status or placement, the SIJ petitioner is not required to have sought specific consent from HHS. Therefore, on or after March 23, 2009, officers must ensure that juveniles in the custody of HHS obtained specific consent from HHS to juvenile court jurisdiction where the juvenile court order determines or
alters the juvenile’s custody status or placement. USCIS will provide HHS guidance regarding adjudications of specific consent as soon as it is available.
Due to the complex nature and changing requirements of specific consent determinations, USCIS Headquarters (HQ) is temporarily assisting in making the determination on specific consent requirements. As outlined in the February 20, 2009 guidance email, Field Officers are instructed to forward certain documents to HQ for those SIJ petitions that may involve specific consent that are filed prior to March 23, 2009. HQ will notify the Field Office of the decision on specific consent. The Field Office will then complete adjudication of the petition. This temporary guidance providing HQ assistance with specific consent determinations will remain in effect until further notice.
Expeditious Adjudication
Section 235(d)(2) of the TVPRA 2008 requires USCIS to adjudicate SIJ petitions within 180 days of filing. Field Offices need to be particularly aware of this new requirement and take measures locally to ensure timely adjudication. Officers are reminded that under 8 CFR 245.6 an interview may be waived for SIJ petitioners under 14 years of age, or when it is determined that
an interview is unnecessary. Eliminating unnecessary interviewing of SIJ petitioners may help in expeditiously adjudicating petitions. Necessary interviews should be scheduled as soon as possible. During an interview, an officer should focus on eligibility for adjustment of status and should avoid questioning a child about the details of the abuse, abandonment or neglect suffered, as those matters were handled by the juvenile court, applying state law. Under no circumstances
can an SIJ petitioner, at any stage of the SIJ process, be required to contact the individual (or family members of the individual) who allegedly abused, abandoned or neglected the juvenile. This provision was added by the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) and is incorporated at section 287(h) of the INA. Officers must ensure proper
completion of background checks, including biometric information clearances and name-checks.
Adjustment of Status for Special Immigrant Juveniles
The TVPRA 2008 amends the adjustment of status provisions for those with SIJ classification at section 245(h) of the INA, to include four new exemptions. Approved SIJ petitioners are now exempted from seven inadmissibility grounds of the INA:
* 212(a)(4) (public charge);
* 212(a)(5)(A) (labor certification);
* 212(a)(6)(A) (aliens present without inspection);
* 212 (a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation);
* 212(a)(6)(D) (stowaways);
* 212(a)(7)(A) (documentation requirements); and
* 212(a)(9)(B) (aliens unlawfully present).
On or after March 23, 2009, none of the above listed grounds of inadmissibility shall apply to SIJ adjustment of status applicants.
Officers are reminded that this list of exemptions is in addition to the waivers available for most other grounds of inadmissibility for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or otherwise being in the public interest. The only unwaivable grounds of inadmissibility for SIJ petitioners are those listed at INA 212(a)(2)(A)-(C) (conviction of certain crimes, multiple criminal convictions, and controlled substance trafficking (except for a single instance of simple possession of 30 grams or
less of marijuana)), and 212(a)(3)(A)-(C), and (E) (security and related grounds, terrorist activities, foreign policy, and participants in Nazi persecution, genocide, torture or extrajudicial killing).
4. Use
This guidance is created solely for the purpose of USCIS personnel in performing their duties relative to adjudication of applications. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantial or procedural, enforceable at law by any individual or any other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other or form or matter.
5. Contact Information
This guidance is effective immediately. Please direct any questions concerning these changes through appropriate supervisory channels to Rosemary Hartmann, Office of Policy and Strategy or Tina Lauver, Office of Field Operations.
Distribution List: Regional Directors
District Directors
Service Center Directors
Field Office Directors
National Benefits Center Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Office of Policy and Strategy and Domestic
Operations
Washington, DC 20529-2140
HQOPS 70/8.5
Memorandum
TO: Field Leadership
FROM: Donald Neufeld /s/
Acting Associate Director
Domestic Operations
Pearl Chang /s/
Acting Chief
Office of Policy & Strategy
DATE: March 24, 2009
SUBJECT: Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions
1. Purpose
This memorandum will inform immigration service officers working Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) petitions about new legislation affecting adjudication of petitions filed for SIJ status.
2. Background
On December 23, 2008, the President signed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA 2008), Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). Section 235(d) of the TVPRA 2008 amends the eligibility requirements for SIJ status at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and accompanying adjustment of status eligibility requirements at section 245(h) of the INA. Most SIJ provisions of the TVPRA 2008 take effect March 23, 2009, although some provisions took effect on December 23, 2008, the date of enactment of the TVPRA 2008.
3. Field Guidance
Eligibility for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions
Page 2
The TVPRA 2008 amended the definition of a “Special Immigrant Juvenile” at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the INA in two ways. First, it expanded the group of aliens eligible for SIJ status. An eligible SIJ alien now includes an alien:
* who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court;
* whom a juvenile court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State; or
* who has been placed under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court.
Accordingly, petitions that include juvenile court orders legally committing a juvenile to or placing a juvenile under the custody of an individual or entity appointed by a juvenile court are now eligible. For example, a petition filed by an alien on whose behalf a juvenile court appointed a guardian now may be eligible. In addition, section 235(d)(5) of the TVPRA 2008
specifies that, if a state or an individual appointed by the state is acting in loco parentis, such a state or individual is not considered a legal guardian for purposes of SIJ eligibility.
The second modification made by the TVPRA 2008 to the definition of special immigrant juvenile concerns the findings a juvenile court must make in order for a juvenile court order to serve as the basis for a grant of SIJ status. Previously, the juvenile court needed to deem a juvenile eligible for long term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment. Under the TVPRA 2008 modifications, the juvenile court must find that the juvenile’s reunification with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law. In short, the TVPRA 2008 removed the need for a juvenile court to deem a juvenile eligible for long-term foster care and replaced it with a requirement that the juvenile court find reunification with one or both parents not viable. If a juvenile court order includes a finding that reunification with one or both parents is not viable due to a similar basis found under State law, the petitioner must establish that such a basis is similar to a finding of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Officers should ensure that juvenile court orders submitted as evidence with an SIJ petition filed on or after March 23, 2009, include this new language.
A petitioner is still required to demonstrate that he or she has been the subject of a determination in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.
Age Requirements
Section 235(d)(6) of the TVPRA 2008 provides age-out protection to SIJ petitioners. As of December 23, 2008, if an SIJ petitioner was a “child” on the date on which an SIJ petition was properly filed, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) cannot deny SIJ status to anyone, regardless of the petitioner’s age at the time of adjudication. Officers must now consider the petitioner’s age at the time of filing to determine whether the petitioner has met the age requirement. Officers must not deny or revoke SIJ status based on age if the alien was a child on the date the SIJ petition was properly filed if it was filed on or after December 23, 2008, or if it was pending as of December 23, 2008. USCIS interprets the use of the term “child” in section 235(d)(6) of the TVPRA 2008 to refer to the definition of child found at section 101(b)(1) of the INA, which states that a child is an unmarried person under 21 years of age. The SIJ definition
found at section 101(a)(27)(J) of the INA does not use the term “child,” but USCIS had previously incorporated the child definition at section 101(b)(1) of the INA into the regulation governing SIJ petitions.
Consent
The TVPRA 2008 also significantly modifies the two types of consent required for SIJ petitions.
Consent to the grant of SIJ status (previously express consent)
The TVPRA 2008 simplified the “express consent” requirement for an SIJ petition. The Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) must consent to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status. This consent is no longer termed “express consent” and is no longer consent to the dependency order serving as a precondition to a grant of SIJ status.
The consent determination by the Secretary, through the USCIS District Director, is an acknowledgement that the request for SIJ classification is bona fide. This means that the SIJ benefit was not “sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or
neglect or abandonment.” See H.R. Rep. No. 105-405, at 130 (1997). An approval of an SIJ petition itself shall be evidence of the Secretary’s consent.
Specific consent
The TVPRA 2008 completely altered the “specific consent” function for those juveniles in federal custody. The TVPRA 2008 vests this function with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) rather than the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as previously delegated to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In addition, Congress simplified the
language to refer simply to “custody,” not actual or constructive custody, as was previously delineated. However, the requirement remains that an SIJ petitioner need only seek specific consent if the SIJ petitioner seeks a juvenile court order determining or altering the SIJ petitioner’s custody status or placement. If an SIJ petitioner seeks to obtain or obtains a juvenile
court order that makes no findings as to the SIJ petitioner’s custody status or placement, the SIJ petitioner is not required to have sought specific consent from HHS. Therefore, on or after March 23, 2009, officers must ensure that juveniles in the custody of HHS obtained specific consent from HHS to juvenile court jurisdiction where the juvenile court order determines or
alters the juvenile’s custody status or placement. USCIS will provide HHS guidance regarding adjudications of specific consent as soon as it is available.
Due to the complex nature and changing requirements of specific consent determinations, USCIS Headquarters (HQ) is temporarily assisting in making the determination on specific consent requirements. As outlined in the February 20, 2009 guidance email, Field Officers are instructed to forward certain documents to HQ for those SIJ petitions that may involve specific consent that are filed prior to March 23, 2009. HQ will notify the Field Office of the decision on specific consent. The Field Office will then complete adjudication of the petition. This temporary guidance providing HQ assistance with specific consent determinations will remain in effect until further notice.
Expeditious Adjudication
Section 235(d)(2) of the TVPRA 2008 requires USCIS to adjudicate SIJ petitions within 180 days of filing. Field Offices need to be particularly aware of this new requirement and take measures locally to ensure timely adjudication. Officers are reminded that under 8 CFR 245.6 an interview may be waived for SIJ petitioners under 14 years of age, or when it is determined that
an interview is unnecessary. Eliminating unnecessary interviewing of SIJ petitioners may help in expeditiously adjudicating petitions. Necessary interviews should be scheduled as soon as possible. During an interview, an officer should focus on eligibility for adjustment of status and should avoid questioning a child about the details of the abuse, abandonment or neglect suffered, as those matters were handled by the juvenile court, applying state law. Under no circumstances
can an SIJ petitioner, at any stage of the SIJ process, be required to contact the individual (or family members of the individual) who allegedly abused, abandoned or neglected the juvenile. This provision was added by the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) and is incorporated at section 287(h) of the INA. Officers must ensure proper
completion of background checks, including biometric information clearances and name-checks.
Adjustment of Status for Special Immigrant Juveniles
The TVPRA 2008 amends the adjustment of status provisions for those with SIJ classification at section 245(h) of the INA, to include four new exemptions. Approved SIJ petitioners are now exempted from seven inadmissibility grounds of the INA:
* 212(a)(4) (public charge);
* 212(a)(5)(A) (labor certification);
* 212(a)(6)(A) (aliens present without inspection);
* 212 (a)(6)(C) (misrepresentation);
* 212(a)(6)(D) (stowaways);
* 212(a)(7)(A) (documentation requirements); and
* 212(a)(9)(B) (aliens unlawfully present).
On or after March 23, 2009, none of the above listed grounds of inadmissibility shall apply to SIJ adjustment of status applicants.
Officers are reminded that this list of exemptions is in addition to the waivers available for most other grounds of inadmissibility for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or otherwise being in the public interest. The only unwaivable grounds of inadmissibility for SIJ petitioners are those listed at INA 212(a)(2)(A)-(C) (conviction of certain crimes, multiple criminal convictions, and controlled substance trafficking (except for a single instance of simple possession of 30 grams or
less of marijuana)), and 212(a)(3)(A)-(C), and (E) (security and related grounds, terrorist activities, foreign policy, and participants in Nazi persecution, genocide, torture or extrajudicial killing).
4. Use
This guidance is created solely for the purpose of USCIS personnel in performing their duties relative to adjudication of applications. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit, substantial or procedural, enforceable at law by any individual or any other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other or form or matter.
5. Contact Information
This guidance is effective immediately. Please direct any questions concerning these changes through appropriate supervisory channels to Rosemary Hartmann, Office of Policy and Strategy or Tina Lauver, Office of Field Operations.
Distribution List: Regional Directors
District Directors
Service Center Directors
Field Office Directors
National Benefits Center Director
Friday, April 3, 2009
Justice Bybee's Torture Memo
Bybee Torture Memo
The full text of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Justice Jay Bybee's Torture Memo, dated August 2002 is linked above. I find it fascinating that an LDS (Mormon) trained attorney (BYU School of Law) and a member of this same faith is directly responsible for the use of torture, including water-boarding, by the U.S. Government and the subsequent shame and international condemnation rightfully heaped onto the Bush Administration for its blatant violation of fundamental human rights.
The full text of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Justice Jay Bybee's Torture Memo, dated August 2002 is linked above. I find it fascinating that an LDS (Mormon) trained attorney (BYU School of Law) and a member of this same faith is directly responsible for the use of torture, including water-boarding, by the U.S. Government and the subsequent shame and international condemnation rightfully heaped onto the Bush Administration for its blatant violation of fundamental human rights.
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Ninth Circuit Associate Justice Jay Bybee to be Indicted by Spanish Court for Crimes Against Humanity
A Spanish court has initiated proceedings that are likely to result in criminal charges against six top legal officials in the Bush administration for their role in crafting the justifications for the use of unlawful detention, torture and other internationally outlawed methods in the "war on terrorism."
The accused include former White House counsel and later US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and former Justice Department lawyer John Yoo, who authored the infamous "torture memo" that justified waterboarding and narrowly defined torture as acts that "would result in death, organ failure, or serious impairment of bodily functions." Also charged is Yoo's former boss in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel Jay Bybee; former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith; former General Counsel for the Department of Defense William Haynes; and David Addington, who was the former chief of staff and legal advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
Jay Bybee is now a sitting justice on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and under the imminent threat of having an extradiction order issued for his arrest for his involvement in the torture of detainees in U.S. custody.
A Spanish human rights group, the Association for the Dignity of Prisoners, filed the legal case on March 17 in Spain's National Court (Audiencia Nacional). The court gave the case to Judge Baltasar Garzón, who gained international fame in 1998 for issuing an arrest order for Augusto Pinochet for the murder, disappearance and torture of Spanish citizens under his military dictatorship in Chile. Pinochet was held under house arrest in Britain for a year and a half until the British government finally rejected Spain's extradition request and allowed him to return to Chile.
Garzón has already turned the 98-page complaint over to state prosecutors for review, and lawyers close to the case have stated that it is almost inevitable that a criminal investigation will proceed, potentially resulting in orders for the arrest of the six US officials, placing them in jeopardy of facing the same fate as Pinochet if they travel abroad.
The complaint argues that Spain has jurisdiction to try the American officials under universal jurisdiction, the same principle invoked in the Pinochet case, which holds that actions so heinous that they rise to the level of crimes against humanity may be tried by any court in the world.
As in the Pinochet case, however, the complaint also anchors its claim on jurisdiction to the fact that five Spanish citizens were victims of the policies crafted and justified by the accused, having been held without charges in Guantánamo and subjected to torture.
It also argues that the US use of torture to extract confessions had forced the Spanish Supreme Court's acquittal of all five of the former Guantánamo detainees, whom Garzón himself had charged with having links to Al Qaeda. This connection provides Garzón with grounds for reopening the case and charging the six former American officials, including Justice Bybee.
The accused include former White House counsel and later US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and former Justice Department lawyer John Yoo, who authored the infamous "torture memo" that justified waterboarding and narrowly defined torture as acts that "would result in death, organ failure, or serious impairment of bodily functions." Also charged is Yoo's former boss in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel Jay Bybee; former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith; former General Counsel for the Department of Defense William Haynes; and David Addington, who was the former chief of staff and legal advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
Jay Bybee is now a sitting justice on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and under the imminent threat of having an extradiction order issued for his arrest for his involvement in the torture of detainees in U.S. custody.
A Spanish human rights group, the Association for the Dignity of Prisoners, filed the legal case on March 17 in Spain's National Court (Audiencia Nacional). The court gave the case to Judge Baltasar Garzón, who gained international fame in 1998 for issuing an arrest order for Augusto Pinochet for the murder, disappearance and torture of Spanish citizens under his military dictatorship in Chile. Pinochet was held under house arrest in Britain for a year and a half until the British government finally rejected Spain's extradition request and allowed him to return to Chile.
Garzón has already turned the 98-page complaint over to state prosecutors for review, and lawyers close to the case have stated that it is almost inevitable that a criminal investigation will proceed, potentially resulting in orders for the arrest of the six US officials, placing them in jeopardy of facing the same fate as Pinochet if they travel abroad.
The complaint argues that Spain has jurisdiction to try the American officials under universal jurisdiction, the same principle invoked in the Pinochet case, which holds that actions so heinous that they rise to the level of crimes against humanity may be tried by any court in the world.
As in the Pinochet case, however, the complaint also anchors its claim on jurisdiction to the fact that five Spanish citizens were victims of the policies crafted and justified by the accused, having been held without charges in Guantánamo and subjected to torture.
It also argues that the US use of torture to extract confessions had forced the Spanish Supreme Court's acquittal of all five of the former Guantánamo detainees, whom Garzón himself had charged with having links to Al Qaeda. This connection provides Garzón with grounds for reopening the case and charging the six former American officials, including Justice Bybee.
Friday, March 27, 2009
Mexico Follow-up
I just finished writing my brief in support of a direct case appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for a client who has a claim under CAT - Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied his application for relief holding that despite proving past torture, which included water-boarding, burning of his skin with cigarettes, physical beating, and electro-shock to his genitals by members of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, that he could safely relocate within Mexico, or alternatively to given testimony to the anti-corruption police.
Our argument basically stresses the fact that corruption inside of Mexico is not incidental, but in fact systemic throughout the judiciary and law enforcement to such an extent that he cannot safely go anywhere in Mexico where the cartels cannot find him. This fact is inescapable given that the Mexican Head of Interpol himself was recently arrested for taking $120,000 a month from the cartels and now Interpol is investigating whether their entire network has been compromised by the criminal gangs.
As Ken Bode of the Indianapolis Star reported on Mach 27, 2009, "In the past few years, drug cartels have grown so greatly in wealth, power and influence that they actually control some parts of the country. They have infiltrated and corrupted every level of Mexican law enforcement to the point that federal police, the army and local police no longer trust each other. A recent study of 400 federales revealed that 90 percent had ties to the cartels."
This is precisely my argument to the BIA, that any return of our client will lead to his renewed persecution and torture as there is realistically no place in Mexico where he can safely return.
Our argument basically stresses the fact that corruption inside of Mexico is not incidental, but in fact systemic throughout the judiciary and law enforcement to such an extent that he cannot safely go anywhere in Mexico where the cartels cannot find him. This fact is inescapable given that the Mexican Head of Interpol himself was recently arrested for taking $120,000 a month from the cartels and now Interpol is investigating whether their entire network has been compromised by the criminal gangs.
As Ken Bode of the Indianapolis Star reported on Mach 27, 2009, "In the past few years, drug cartels have grown so greatly in wealth, power and influence that they actually control some parts of the country. They have infiltrated and corrupted every level of Mexican law enforcement to the point that federal police, the army and local police no longer trust each other. A recent study of 400 federales revealed that 90 percent had ties to the cartels."
This is precisely my argument to the BIA, that any return of our client will lead to his renewed persecution and torture as there is realistically no place in Mexico where he can safely return.
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